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The university: its defects and defenses  
 
Darwinian medicine explores the evolutionary origins of sickness with the goal of 
treating the sick more effectively.1 By spelling out what evolution had in mind, so to 
speak, when it endowed the human body with the propensity to get sick, Darwinian 
medicine helps us assess the benefits and costs of alternative medical interventions.  
 
The distinction between defects and defenses is central to Darwinian medicine. A broken 
leg is a defect—one would not want to leave it alone just in case some good comes of it. 
A fever, on the other hand, is a defense: it brings discomfort, it creates tissue damage, it 
depletes nutrients, and in extreme circumstances the patient might die from it; but fever 
also serves a useful function—it keeps bacterial pathogens in check, it serves as a signal 
to the patient to take it easy, and under ordinary circumstances it helps the patient 
survive. Darwinian medicine takes the position that fever is an evolved response, with the 
implication that we must trade off the costs and benefits of suppressing a fever when 
treating it.  
 
                                                 
* This paper was prepared for presentation at the conference on “Governance of Higher 
Education Institutions and Systems” at the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute 
on June 4/5, 2002 and for publication in Governing Academe, ed. Ronald Ehrenberg, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. The ideas presented in it are drawn from my book-
in-progress, How Universities Think. I thank the Ford Foundation and the John Simon 
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for their generous support. 
1 Nesse and Williams 1994. 
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This paper applies Darwinian medicine to the university. Much that looks like a defect of 
the university is in fact a defense. Defects are bad; they need to be eliminated. Defenses 
look bad but they are subtle design solutions that evolved in interaction with a demanding 
environment; they need to be preserved, or at the very least it needs to be recognized that 
eliminating them comes at a cost. The vexed institution of tenure is an example of a 
defense, as are the impossibly rigid boundaries separating the disciplines. 
 
Effective university reform must distinguish between defects and defenses so it can 
eliminate the defects and go lightly on the defenses. Making such distinctions requires an 
understanding of what the university is for—what problems the university was designed, 
or evolved, to solve.  
 
I contend that the function of the university is to enable deep specialization. The 
structures of the university emerged to solve several problems: how to nurse deeply 
specialized scholars, how to protect them from each other and the outside world, and how 
to pool the results of their distributed inquiries.  
 
The problems to which the university is a response are hard problems, and there is no free 
lunch. Institutional solutions are generally second-best in the sense that they constitute 
the best solution that is feasible in the light of environmental constraints (in which case 
they are a defense), or they are less than second-best (in which case they are defective).  
 
As a necessary by-product of fulfilling their productive functions, the structures of the 
university have a tendency to ossify. It is precisely because the powerful incentives and 
protections afforded by these structures are intertwined with their potential for 
ossification that it is hard to disentangle where the defects of the university end and its 
defenses begin.  
 
The university’s built-in tendency to ossify and the co-mingling of defects and defenses 
explain why the structures of the university are so resistant to change and improvement— 
why they are hard to change in the first place, and hard to change for the better.   
 3 
 
To complicate matters, ossification implies that a solution that worked well initially (it 
started out as a defense) can become dysfunctional over time (it ends up becoming a 
defect). For this reason, any practical project of reforming the way the university is 
governed needs to respect thick history and local detail. Armchair-theorizing cannot say 
definitively “this is a defect—off with its head” and “that’s a defense—better not mess 
with it.”  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. I begin with a short history of the 
university. Drawing on history, I argue that the structures of the university that enable 
deep specialization are naturally and inherently resistant to change. What makes the 
university strong is precisely what makes it weak. I spell out how institutions of higher 
education can be designed to remain intellectually vibrant and structurally pliable even 
though their constituent elements—deeply specialized scholars and discipline-based 
departments—are doomed to ossify.  
 
A short history of the university   
 
In the history of the human race, the medieval university stands out as one of the great 
political institutions of all time. It drew Western Europe out of the Dark Ages and into 
the light. It invented cosmopolitan structures and norms that are still with us today.  
 
Two archetypes emerged in 12th and 13th century France and Italy. Paris offered a free 
space for the theological debates that prepared the way for the Reformation. Bologna 
trained students in the legal statutes and reasoning that would come to support 
increasingly complex political and economic institutions all over Europe.  
 
In both cases, a complex institution cristallized, the result of a decentralized process of 
annealing. Both Paris and Bologna were shaped by the conflict with their environment, 
and in similar ways, but they ended up at opposite ends of the governance spectrum, Paris 
controlled by its faculty, Bologna by its students.  
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Paris attracted students from all over Europe. They came to hear the charismatic Peter 
Abelard apply the scholastic method to questions of speculative theology, such as 
whether the bread and wine consumed during mass truly turn into the body and blood of 
Christ, or only in spirit. In an age permeated by religion, in which any position outside of 
the pale defined by the Church was considered heresy and heretics were burned at the 
stake, the sic et non (pro and con) exploration of a theological issue was nothing short of 
daring, and Abelard’s students picked up on the fact that he was onto something big.  
 
The University of Paris thus started out as an amorphous group of faculty and students 
collecting in and around the Cathedral School of Notre Dame, with few norms and no 
internal oganizational structure in place. Over the years, the faculty fought with the 
Church over rights and entitlements, including in particular the right to appoint new 
faculty. The pope and the emperor were drawn into these fights, and the faculty played 
them off against each other.  
 
Migration, boycott, and violence pushed forward the cause of the faculty. It helped that 
the medieval university had no physical plant—the faculty could threaten to leave for 
another city and take the university (themselves and their students) with them. On 
occasion, this threat was realized, in which case it led to new university foundings in 
surrounding cities; mass migration turned out to be the mechanism by which the idea of 
the university, and its emerging structures, spread.  
 
As each bitter conflict was resolved, some protective piece of structure fell into place—
some right was awarded here, another entitlement there. Pieces of structure were 
negotiated to prevent future conflict, or to encourage non-violent conflict resolution, or 
for damage control purposes. In this way, over the course of a century, an extraordinarly 
complex institution emerged brick by protective brick. In a decentralized process planned 
by nobody, structures evolved that protected the inhabitants of the university from the 
outside world. Thus, in the midst of the Middles Ages, an era not known for its 
intellectual tolerance, the university carved out a safe space for scholarly inquiry.     
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Because it was the faculty who led the fight against the Church, Paris ended up with a 
governance structure dominated by the faculty: it was the faculty who voted on the issues 
of the day, staffed the administration, set the curriculum, and appointed new faculty.  
 
As the university became increasingly differentiated into schools and departments, and 
factions within schools and departments, and factions within factions, it became 
internally conflicted. The members of a faction tend to reserve the most intense feelings 
of hatred for their intellectual neighbors rather than for the inhabitants of far-away 
worlds. This makes it very hard for faculty in the same, or closely related, fields to agree 
on appointments and curriculum design.  
 
Protective structures followed faculty infighting: strong walls sprang up to separate the 
departments and schools, and federalist structures emerged. The voting procedures that 
aggregated the preferences within and across departments and schools became ever more 
complex. The university thus developed an intricate internal organization to protect the 
faculty from each other. 
 
Meanwhile, students flocked from over the mountains (the northern and western parts of 
Western Europe) to study law in Bologna, and it was they who led the fight that created a 
great university. Foreign students did not have the same rights and entitlements as the 
citizens of Bologna. They were vulnerable to exploitation by the local townspeople, 
especially landlords and tradesmen, with no legal recourse. If a drunken student got into a 
fight and killed a local, he would be judged by a jury consisting of local citizens, and the 
outcome would not generally be favorable—hence the students’ demand to be judged by 
their student peers.  
 
The foreign students banded together for reasons of protection. They formed nations, that 
is, groupings of students with shared geographic origins. Collectively, they fought the 
Commune of Bologna for rights and entitlements. Here, too, the weapons of choice were 
migration, boycott, and violence. Once again, in the course of a century a complex 
institution emerged, loaded with rights and entitlements protecting its inhabitants from 
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the outside world—but now, because it was the students who carried the water, the 
university ended up with a governance structure dominated by students: it was the 
students who voted on the issues of the day, staffed the administration, set the 
curriculum, and appointed the faculty. 
 
The institutional structures that emerged in Paris and Bologna include bottom-up 
governance, representative assemblies, decentralized federalist structures, complex voting 
procedures, and institutionalized forms of conflict resolution (the latter snuffed out the 
violence that used to be an inevitable by-product of conflict).  
 
The idea of the university emerged, manifesting itself in the norms of ubique docendi (the 
right to teach at any institution after graduating from one of the them), open access, open 
information, and free inquiry. These norms, powerful as they are, are ultimately 
derivative to the institutional structures of the university: a norm of free inquiry is not 
worth much without a structure in place that protects the inquirer from being imprisoned, 
killed, or (worst of all) excommunicated.  
 
The Middle Ages saw the emergence of complex voting procedures in the Italian city 
state and of bottom-up governance processes in the medieval guild; but the politics of the 
city states remained violence-prone, and the guilds did not exactly embrace ideas of open 
access and open information. The university was unique in the astonishing combination 
of structures and norms it developed allowing its inhabitants to engage in peaceful 
intellectual inquiry and protecting them from the outside world and from each other. 
 
In its early fighting years, the medieval university was as intellectually vibrant as its 
structures were pliable. Once its structures, and the associated protections, got locked in, 
the university ossified intellectually. The scholastic method, wild and wonderful in its 
early years, matured and joined the establishment, finding its apotheosis in Thomas 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologica (the title itself has an end-of-history quality, quite unlike 
Abelard’s title Sic et Non, which has an open-ended air about it). The scholastic method 
degenerated into an ever more refined system of logic-chopping exercises applied in a 
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mindless and mechanical way to questions of great irrelevance, as in, how many angels 
are there on a pinhead. As the society surrounding the university became more interested 
in history and language, and more empirically oriented, the scholastic method was 
doomed.  
 
The medieval university missed the boat come the Renaissance. In Italy, many 
universities continued to apply the scholastic method for one hundreds years after the 
society around them had reinvented itself in full. The intellectual underpinnings of the 
Renaissance were developed in private academies outside of the university. Humanist 
ideas got picked up by newly founded universities, including universities in Northern 
Europe far away from the geographic center of Renaissance action.  
 
During the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, institutions of higher learning 
were established by local rulers seeking prestige and control (the principle of cuius regio, 
eius religio applied not only to countries, but also to universities). The university in 
Europe was in decline in the 17th century and became utterly moribund in the 18th 
century. It was missing in action during the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution, 
which largely took place outside of the university, in private academies, societies, and 
salons. Many of the leading scholars and scientists were independently wealthy, and it 
was their wealth that afforded them “a room of their own,” and not the protective 
structures of the university.  
 
After a steady decline lasting several centuries (and contradicting the idea of history 
being an “ever upward-lifting” process), 19th century Germany entered the world stage 
with a couple of innovations that, together with the inventions of the medieval university, 
came to define the modern university.  
 
Progressive reformers developed the norms of Lehrfreiheit (freedom to teach) and 
Lernfreiheit (freedom to learn). Wilhelm von Humboldt, in particular, promoted the idea 
that science is not a fixed body of knowledge that students can mechanically learn by 
heart. Our understanding of the world is necessarily incomplete, and the quest for 
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knowledge is an ongoing enterprise of which students must be an integral part so they can 
partake in the emerging understanding, which is as much about process as it is about 
results. Even while Humboldt established the primacy of research over teaching, his 
humanist approach emphasized the unity of inquiry and learning. It was thus that 
Germany developed the idea and institution of the deeply specialized research professor 
who combines research and teaching on a single discipline-based subject.  
 
Deep specialization and the disciplines emerged in tandem, and for a reason. Because the 
world is complex and the individual brain is limited in its cognitive grasp, the task of 
figuring out how the world works needs to be split up into manageable pieces, but then 
the results of all the distributed inquiries need to be pulled together to form a synoptic 
picture—the ultimate goal, after all, is to help the human race gain control over harsh and 
capricious Nature (including human nature). To this end, the university slices the world 
into a hierarchically ordered set of disciplines and fields-within-disciplines and subfields-
within-fields. A deeply specialized scholar will spend his life tending to some obscure 
question which, taken in isolation, is completely pointless. His research gains meaning 
and impact only by being pooled with research of other scholars who are working on the 
same, or closely related, questions, and the research of a group of scholars gains meaning 
and impact only if it connects and cumulates within the larger discipline.  
 
In Germany, discipline-based deep specialization had powerful impact. Germany started 
out economically backward, and an intellectual backwater. It emerged as a leader in the 
industrial revolution in large part because of its universities. German science and industry 
flourished as a result of its pathbreaking research and teaching in physics, chemistry, 
agriculture, forestry, and other disciplines of central importance to industrialization.  
 
In the case of Germany, university reform was shaped by an element of design— 
Humboldt’s brilliant ideas as they manifested themselves in the newly founded 
University of Berlin. The vibrant German model was copied all over the world, including 
the United States (Johns Hopkins, Cornell, Chicago). In Germany, it ossified. Deep 
specialization, and its attendant narrowmindedness, battled the humanist desire for 
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holistic understanding—and won. Lack of competition and inflexible bureaucracy 
contributed to the decline. Today, the German university is largely moribund.  
 
The idea of the university, and its institutional manifestation, was refined over the course 
of eight centuries. The university is a hybrid mix of bottom-up elements, which were 
shaped by evolution, and top-down elements, which are the result of deliberate design. 
The structures and norms of the university allow human beings to conduct systematic and 
cumulative research and thereby gain a better understanding of the way the world works. 
The medieval university with its emphasis on speculative theology and law helped 
Western Europe shake off the suffocating yoke of the Church and develop complex 
political and economic institutions. The German university with its cutting-edge applied 
research and humanistic teaching ideals contributed to the industrialization of the German 
economy and the consolidation of the German nation.  
 
What makes the university strong makes it weak   
 
The history of the university gives us an idea of what the university is for. The university 
is home to structures that nurse and protect and connect deeply specialized scholars 
 
There is a dark side to the history of the university. It is largely a history of ossification 
punctuated by bursts of intellectual vibrancy and structural innovation. In the large sweep 
of history, change occurs not because existing scholars, departments, and institutions 
move with the times, but through replacement. New ideas and methods are developed by 
new generations of scholars working in newly founded disciplines. New structures that 
support new forms of inquiry and learning emerge in newly founded universities.  
 
Existing institutions do change—some of them, some of the time. When institutional 
change occurs, it is typically in response to the political or economic threat posed by 
entrants. Departments have a harder time reinventing themselves, and when they do, it is 
because of generational turnover, for individual scholars tend not to change at all.  
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The tendency of the university to ossify is an integral aspect of its positive function to 
enable deep specialization. As knowledge cumulates, it necessarily moves on. Inevitably, 
areas of inquiry that are vibrant today will be overrun by the masses tomorrow and dead 
meat the day after. But the constituent elements of the university—deeply specialized 
scholars and discipline-based departments—cannot easily change their stripes simply 
because their stripes are the way they are for a reason.  
 
Tenure is supposed to give individual scholars the freedom to think unthinkable thoughts, 
embark on high-risk-high-return research programs, stand up to The Powers That Be, and 
so on. It doesn’t always work that way, or even most of the time. In the university, it is the 
tenured faculty, above all, who are the fundamental source of ossification.  
 
The problem is in part emotional, in other part cognitive, and it lies in the scholarly brain. 
First, the identity of a scholar, his connections and loyalties, are defined by his 
socialization in graduate school. Second, as a result of his graduate training, his brain is 
locked into seeing the world in a particular way, and he is blind to new ideas and methods 
that slice the world in a different way. 
 
To understand the nature of the problem, we need to take a look at graduate school. It 
takes about seven years for an uncommitted amateur to become an engaged scholar. 
Graduate school shapes the student emotionally and cognitively as it draws him into a 
scholarly community. It is the peer group that adopted him in graduate school that will 
later write referee reports when he submits articles to journals and outside letters when he 
comes up for tenure.  
 
A scholar who changes horses in mid-career loses the support of his peer group and is 
forced to reinvent himself from scratch. This requires personal courage and the 
willingness to take a risk, and these are not traits the tenure system selects for. Past 
behavior is the best predictor of future behavior, and it is a rare occurrence for a scholar 
who was conformist enough to attain a tenure-track position and achieve tenure suddenly 
to buck the trend and cook up wild and wonderful ideas in mid-career, let alone in old age. 
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Graduate school brainwashes the student–literally, in the sense that it rewires his brain 
connections—into becoming a Fachidiot, that is, an expert who has a very particular way 
of seeing the world. The expert is equipped to make extremely fine distinctions on one 
dimension even while he is blind to the existence of other dimensions.  
 
Laypeople are as easily impressed by experts as they are contemptuous of them, and for 
good reason: they are awed by the subtlety of expert analysis, especially if it gives them 
purchase on some part of the world; and they deplore the experts’ inability to apply 
common sense and take a holistic view of a problem. The universally felt ambivalence 
towards experts tells us something important about the existence of a “budget constraint” 
in the human brain. A layperson who turns into an expert does not stay the same on all 
dimensions of his thinking except for the one dimension on which he gained expertise: the 
expert’s ability to see in great depth on one dimension reduces his appreciation of other 
dimensions. And indeed, the expression Fachidiot translates as “he who knows a lot in his 
area of expertise but is a total idiot when it comes to other areas.” 
 
The multi-year process of enculteration by which a student becomes a scholar generates an 
emotional and cognitive lock-in. The problem is that (undesirable) lock-in is a necessary 
by-product of (desirable) deep specialization. If the purpose of the university is to reap the 
gains from deep specialization, there must be a process in place that turns uncommitted 
amateurs into engaged experts, and such a process necessarily produces Fachidioten with 
rigid identities and warped cognitions.      
 
The Fachidiot is nothing by himself—he is necessarily part of a group consisting of like-
minded individuals competing with other groups. Part of the explanation of ossification 
lies in the individual expert’s brain, but the other part can be found in the expert’s social 
embeddedness, or in the interaction of expert brains.  
 
The workings of scientific groups can only be understood with reference to the evolution 
of those parts of the human brain that are in charge of regulating social interaction. 
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Social cognition and social emotions developed in the human brain approximately 30,000 
to 300,000 years ago. In this ancestral environment, humans clustered together in tribes of 
size 150, or thereabouts, and they were continually at war with other tribes. The emotional 
and cognitive makeup of the human race is designed to support cooperation within tribes 
and competition between tribes. Human beings work well in groups of size 150—this is 
the number of people who can interact regularly, communicate face-to-face, and learn to 
trust each other. 
 
The clusters that form the backbone of scientific networks typically count about 150 
members. Groupings of scientists have a small-town feel to them—think of the 
pervasiveness of gossip, which serves both a social policing function and an 
epistemological function, as in “you can’t trust his regressions, he always fudges the 
data.”  
 
Scientific clusters play an enormously important motivational role—important because 
deeply specialized inquiry can quickly become dreary and alienating, and there needs to 
be something in place that will make scholars keep chipping away at some minuscule 
problem that taken in isolation is utterly meaningless. Within clusters, scholars give each 
other the emotionally comforting sense of belonging to a community and the spiritually 
uplifting sense of contributing to a larger purpose, and they dole out professional 
recognition and status.  
 
Scholars are energized not only by within-group approval but also by the between-group 
competition. A scholarly peer group typically stands in an enemy relationship with a 
competing group that largely shares its way of viewing the world—but comes up with a 
competing answer to some critical question. The identity of a scholar is defined in large 
part by the opposition to the competing group whose members are seen as stupid, or 
wicked, or both.  
 
Consider, for example, two groups that are obsessed with questions concerning the size 
and stability of the money multiplier, but one group “proves conclusively” that the money 
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multiplier is large in size and stable, whereas the other group “demonstrates beyond any 
doubt” that the money multiplier is small in size and instable. The two sets of results 
yield opposite conclusions about the proper conduct of monetary policy, and each group 
considers the policy prescriptions of the other group to be utterly irresponsible.  
 
At times, the two groups converge on some theoretical or empirical point, but then they 
immediately part ways on some new dimension of the problem, as a result of which their 
disagreement about the proper conduct of monetary policy keeps right on ticking. To the 
uninitiated, it looks like new arguments and evidence keep on chasing the same old 
conclusions. But scientific progress manifests itself in the gradual creep of conclusions 
made possible by the partial convergence of the competing factions. Then again, it is 
possible that the gradual creep is moving around in a circle—scientific progress doesn’t 
follow automatically from factional conflict.  
 
Factionalism at its best ensures that the two sides of one dimension of an issue get 
explored thoroughly before the conclusion moves on—at which time a new dimension 
opens up, and its two sides in turn get explored thoroughly. Scholars end up doing a 
thorough job not because they are obeying an ethical mandate to explore all sides of the 
issue thoroughly, or because they care about The Truth, but because the two sides of a 
given dimension “belong” to two competing groups and because there is a process in 
place that moves the system on to a new dimension when the exploration of a given 
dimension is exhausted. Scholars are intensely driven by the prospect of beating The 
Other—of bombing Them out of the water by demonstrating definitively that the money 
multiplier really truly is large in size and stable over time—not! As a motivating force, 
the social utility of their research pales in comparison, which is just as well because the 
ultimate purpose of their research can be quite obscure at times.   
 
Factionalism does not figure prominently, or even at all, in formal philosophies of 
science. The idea that factional conflict drives scientific progress sits uncomfortably with 
the normative ideal of the lone scholar in single-minded pursuit of the truth 
dispassionately engaging in classical hypothesis testing. The scientific process is loaded 
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with social cognition and social emotions. If science is successful, it is because its 
motivational structures are consistent with the cognitive and emotional makeup of the 
human brain, and in particular with the human desire to cooperate in small groups and 
compete with other small groups. Factionalism is the motor of scientific progress, and 
historically it is factionalism that has moved the university out of its ossification trap.  
 
Disciplines ossify in a very peculiar way. Factional conflict keeps them moving, and so 
the inhabitants of a discipline tend to believe they are making progress over time, and 
indeed, oftentimes they are in fact making progress. But one important function of the 
disciplines is to protect the established lines of inquiry, and when those lines become 
obsolete, they keep right on protecting.  
 
Disciplinary job market and reward structures shape what kinds of inquiry are advantaged, 
what kinds disadvantaged. They tend to discourage interdisciplinary research, and since 
the cutting edge often lies in the interstices of the disciplines, this is a problem.  
 
Disciplines are controlled by journal editors and leading scholars who collectively decide 
what gets published in the top journals, who is awarded tenure, and which activities are to 
be supported by grants and showered with honors. There are selection biases in place that 
create a tendency for self-perpetuation. Perhaps most importantly, there is a natural bias 
toward gerontocracy that benefits scholars who are in mid-career or even over the hill. 
This is the group from which journal editors and leading scholars are drawn from, and 
they will tend to favor traditional work and support clones of themselves.  
 
Scholars are part of a scientific network that cuts across universities, and this network 
typically covers a specialized subfield within a discipline. In their home institution, 
scholars are members of a discipline-based department that includes many different 
specialized subfields. Like disciplines, departments consist of scholars who clone 
themselves in hiring and promotions because they feel emotionally more comfortable with 
people who think like them; because they feel threatened by newcomers with different 
ideas; and simply because the new is the wicked.  
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The logic of departments, however, differs from the logic of disciplines. Departments have 
two special problems: a morale problem and a problem of Balkanization. First, a 
department consists of a mix of cosmopolitan scholars who are part of national networks, 
scholars with local loyalties who are involved in teaching and administration, and scholars 
who have given up on life and are deeply frustrated. Second, the department contains a 
collection of narrowly specialized scholars who don’t interact with each other 
intellectually because they don’t speak the same language.  
 
The morale problem is fundamental to the university because of the random nature of 
scientific progress. Some scholars work out, and most don’t, and many of the deeply 
specialized scholars who don’t work out end up as flotsam. The value of the university lies 
in those who work out—it’s just that it’s impossible to predict in advance who that will be. 
Prediction is impossible because the attributes that make an individual scholar excel are 
only partially located in her brain—they mostly lie in the interaction between her brain, 
the surrounding brains, and the environment. The successful scholar is in the right place at 
the right time, and the idiosyncratic attributes of her brain connect with the idiosyncratic 
attributes of the brains around her in just the right way. With the right combustive mix in 
place, the resulting insights, which are collectively produced, find novel application to 
problems posed in the literature or the outside world. When this occurs, the effect is 
magical, and this is what the university is all about. The problem is, most of the time there 
is no magic, and the question is what should we do with the empties.   
 
The university is a cruel institution. It takes the best and the brightest, promises them the 
world, and then it throws most of them to the dogs. The vast majority of scholars start out 
as fresh-eyed and bushy-tailed newly minted assistant professors; their career peaks as 
they become tenured associate professors; and from then on their human capital declines 
steadily for reasons that are mostly not under their control. As a result, there is a lot of 
bitterness and resentment floating around in the heads of the tenured faculty. If the 
resulting morale problem is not properly addressed, it will stand in the way of intellectual 
renewal because frustrated faculty will clog the collective decision-making processes of 
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the university. A well-designed university picks up its burned-out faculty and moves them 
into other activities they can take pride in, such as teaching or administration.  
 
(In the modern era, pity with burned-out tenured faculty might come across as misplaced 
given that the tenured faculty contribute to the overproduction of PhDs, as a result of 
which many of the best and brightest never reach the level of assistant professor in the 
first place, which creates a lot of unhappiness. A mind is a terrible thing to waste, and this 
mass wastage of minds, is a disgrace to the university. Politically speaking, however, 
frustrated tenured faculty are more important than are the rejects of the academy: the latter 
don’t vote.)    
 
To understand the problem of Balkanization—and to see why this is a hard problem— 
consider the example of an economics department whose stated goal it is to hire and 
promote “excellence.” Of course the stated goal of the department will not generally 
correspond to the actual goals of all faculty in the department: there are always some 
faculty who get very anxious about hiring and promoting scholars who are better than they 
are, and for this reason alone mediocrity can beat excellence. For now, let’s go with the 
stated goal. It turns out that excellence is a rather vague goal, and once the highly 
specialized faculty begin to entertain concrete candidates, they will disagree violently on 
who is excellent. (Not that there is any actual violence: in this respect, the structures of the 
university are doing their job.) The economic theorists, the labor economists, the 
macroeconomists, and the economic historians—they all support different candidates, and 
since each group constitutes a minority in the department, no candidate would ever gain 
majority support if each group voted its preferences.  
 
A malfunctioning department is Balkanized, and its members will not agree on anything, 
including hiring and promotions. Such a department will ossify quickly.  
 
A well-functioning department will follow a decision-making process involving 
logrolling, i.e., reciprocal deference to specialized subgroups. Today, it is the turn of the 
labor economists to identify their desired candidate, and everybody else holds their nose 
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and votes along. Tomorrow, it is the turn of the macroeconomists, and everybody supports 
their selection sight unseen.  
 
As a result of this universalistic decision-making process, the department will tend to hire 
and promote ever more of the same: scholars who are excellent as conceived by 
traditionally defined and narrowly specialized groups. Suppose the cutting edge in 
economics is a new field that cuts across traditional fields (an example might be political 
economy, which cuts across monetary economics, international trade, public finance, and 
much else besides). Or suppose the cutting edge is not represented in the department  all 
(an example might be behavioral and experimental economics, which includes elements of 
psychology and uses empirical tools that are not standard fare in other subfields of 
economics). Then the department will fail to hire candidates on the cutting edge because 
the labor economists and the macroeconomists will use their turn to hire clones of 
themselves. And if the department hires one of Them by accident, the outsider will do less 
well come promotion time because departmental resources are allocated by subfield and 
the political support structures are tied to the subfields. Thus, there is a seminar series in 
labor economics and in macroeconomics, and not in political economy or experimental 
economics, and so the scholarly misfit will have relatively less opportunity to connect 
with his peer group. External labor economists and macroeconomists are asked to write 
tenure letters, and not political economists or experimental economists, and so the scholar 
who is neither fish nor flesh will end up looking weaker than he really is—on paper, 
which is what matters in a bureaucratic promotion system.   
 
And of course if the cutting edge involves interdisciplinary inquiry, an economics 
department that is oriented exclusively towards meeting the standards of the discipline of 
economics cannot cope at all.  
 
But let us not kill the departments and disciplines all too quickly. They have evolved to 
protect scholars from each other and from the outside world, and their protection function 
is all too easily overlooked. Structures that mute conflict tend to be underappreciated 
when they do an excellent job because little if any conflict is observed in equilibrium— 
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and so people forget about the problem that is being solved by the structures and “see” 
only the patholological implications of the structures. Based on their partial understanding, 
they propose structural reform. It is only when the structures are torn down and conflict 
breaks out that it becomes apparent that the structures were doing some good.  
 
Consider, for a moment, an economist and a historian who are coming up for tenure. They 
have very different takes on the issue of globalization. The economist thinks “more is 
better,” and he has money and material goods in mind. In his Panglossian world, 
everybody benefits from free trade, especially the poorest of the poor, and if the countries 
that are political and economic basketcases would only adopt the superior political and 
economic institutions of the West, they could work their way out of poverty and achieve 
the same high standards of living as the West.  
 
In comparison, the historian looks through the glass, darkly, and sees globalization as the 
direct descendant of colonialism and imperialism. If the West is rich (and it is of course 
merely materially rich; spiritually it is impoverished), it is because the West stole from the 
poor—it extracted resources from the countries it colonialized and as a by-product 
screwed them up politically and economically, which is why many of the former colonies 
are such a mess.  
 
The economist despises the historian for her non-rigorous method—thick description of 
local and historical detail, no grand theory, lots of left-wing ideology. The historian is 
horrified at the way the economist acts as if a reductionist theory can apply universally to 
all countries and explain all of history: what an impoverished understanding it is that 
economics promotes!  
 
Now imagine the two (or their friends in their respective departments) could vote on each 
others’ tenure cases. It would be a disaster. Neither of them would survive. And yet it is 
arguably useful for the university to have both (or even more than two) sides of the 
globalization debate represented in its walls. And it does—because the tenure process 
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neatly separates faculty who can’t possibly get along: economists vote on economists, and 
historians vote on historians.    
 
Deeply specialized scholars and discipline-based departments are the way they are for 
good reason. They are the engines behind scientific progress, a dynamic force that has 
changed the face of the earth, and yet they are deeply conservative.  
 
Managing change in the university 
 
Universities are all about deep specialization. This is why they can get stuck in time—and 
do. The question is how institutions can be designed to remain intellectually vibrant and 
structurally pliable even if their component parts necessarily ossify.  
 
At the level of the individual scholar, little if anything can be done; ditto at the level of the 
departments and disciplines. At the level of the institution, there is hope, though history 
tells us that there is no easy solution to “the problem of the university.”  
 
The single most important factor affecting the quality and content of the research and 
teaching in an institution—the factor that determines whether the institution is on the 
knowledge production frontier—is the selection of academic personnel. For good and for 
bad, the selection of academic personnel (recruiting and promotions to tenure) are firmly 
controlled by the departments, which are self-governed and self-perpetuating.  
 
So what’s a reform-minded university leader supposed to do? The decision-making 
processes in her departments are impenetrable. She cannot effectively order the 
departments to hire and promote scholars on the cutting edge: she does not have the 
specialized expertise to challenge the faculty if they fail to do her bidding. For the same 
reason, a university president cannot set up an effective incentive scheme. If she were to 
promise a 10% pay raise to the faculty in all departments whose hiring and promotion 
practices are on the cutting edge, one of two things will happen. Either the faculty will 
claim that they are hiring and promoting on the cutting edge, in which case the president 
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lacks the wherewithall to check the faculty’s claims. Or, if the president defines an 
operational measure of the cutting edge, the faculty will play to the measure, and since the 
measure is necessarily simplistic relative to the thick reality of the (deeply specialized) 
cutting edge, the incentive scheme will end up backfiring awfully. In the last resort, the 
president could get rid of the departments altogether. But departments are efficient ways 
of collecting deeply specialized scholars and organizing their teaching. And in the modern 
era it is highly ranked departments that define a highly ranked university, and the 
ambitious president cares deeply about improving her rankings.  
 
What the president can do is put into place structures that promote internal competition 
and thereby exert pressure on the departments to become more flexible and nimble-
minded. Internal competition can be achieved by piling cross-cutting structures on top of 
the departmental structures. For example, an interdisciplinary program might draw on the 
discipline-based departments to staff its courses. Internal competition can also be put into 
place by linking units of the university that naturally have something in common even 
while they pander to different constituencies. For example, there is an overlap in the 
research and teaching of the economics department and the business school.  
 
The idea is to connect the units of the university in a way that encourages resources to 
flow in the direction of (relatively) better performance. So, for example, if the 
interdisciplinary program is vibrant and does a better job at attracting students than do the 
discipline-based departments, then the dean could allocate faculty positions to the 
interdisciplinary program. The faculty who get hired into the interdisciplinary program 
would be housed in one of the feeder departments, which ensures that there is some 
discipline-based quality control going on. The presence of the interdisciplinary program 
changes the personnel selection process in a subtle way: the departments retain their veto 
powers but they lose their agendasetting powers—they can prevent candidates from 
getting hired and promoted, but they cannot select candidates. This solution is not perfect: 
there will be some excellent interdisciplinary candidates who will not pass muster with the 
departments. But it does allow for change at the margin: there will be some candidates 
whom the departments would not have chosen to put on the agenda, but once those 
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candidates are on the agenda, especially if they are not seen to be directly competing with 
candidates the departments have identified as its own, they can attract a majority of the 
departmental vote. With this solution in place, the home departments will over time grow 
in the direction of the interdisciplinary “action.”  
 
Along the same lines, the economics department and the business school could both offer 
business economics to undergraduates. If students self-select into the courses taught by the 
business school because the faculty in the business school take teaching more seriously, 
and if resources follow the flow of students, there will come a point where the economics 
department will have to rethink its “take no prisoners” approach to undergraduate teaching 
and overhaul its dated curriculum. 
 
To promote change, decentralized structures must preserve diversity even while they 
enable competition. Diversity is valuable for two reasons. First, it keeps a multiplicity of 
perspectives alive. The scientific process is inherently deeply uncertain: we do not know 
which strains of research and teaching will be valuable tomorrow. Universities need to 
hedge their bets. When the action moves on, they must have someone on the ground who 
will pick up the ball. Second, diversity allows experimentation to occur. Diverse 
departments engage in different activities, and some activities will turn out to be more 
successful than others. The less successful departments can then adopt the successful 
experiments.  
 
Diversity and competition complement each other: it is diversity that makes people and 
projects stand out in the first place, and it is competition that allows for the dissemination 
of better-performing strategies and successful experiments.  
 
To preserve diversity, decentralized structures must be messy and loose. The competition 
between the units must be limited in scope. All-engulfing competition has a tendency to 
homogenize—if everybody is chasing the same rewards under identical environmental 
constraints, everybody will end up behaving the same way, and if there are selection 
effects, there will be a homogenization of types.   
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One way to limit competition is to put multiple cross-cutting and partially contradictory 
performance criteria into place. Different departments can then choose to meet different 
combinations of criteria. This way each department is forced to confront competitive 
pressures and yet maintain a unique profile because it gets evaluated by a unique 
combination of performance standards. 
 
Designing effective decentralized structures is difficult because we must give up our 
natural tendency to think in binary extremes. On the one hand, we do not want each 
academic unit to operate as an independent and isolated island, with no performance 
measure in sight. This will lead to poor performance in research and teaching for sure. On 
the other hand, we do not want to put into place simplistic quantitative performance 
standards that apply uniformly to all units. Such a scheme will surely backfire, first, 
because it fails to respect local detail and, second, because faculty will max out on the 
dimension of their performance that is being measured even while they continue to shirk 
on other dimensions.    
 
While it is important to implement some degree of competition, which necessarily implies 
the use of performance standards, we must avoid incentivizing everything in sight. The 
university must retain some free and open spaces for playful exploration and random 
happenings. There is a need for incentives, but incentive schemes should not be so tightly 
wound that they prevent faculty from working on projects that will only pay off in the 
long term, or are high-risk high-return, or politically controversial.  
 
Leaving slack in the system makes state legislators nervous because they suspect that the 
slack will be exploited by lazy deadwood faculty, and they don’t want the taxpayer to pay 
good salaries to faculty who are doing nothing but living the good life. But we must keep 
in mind that it is not the first goal of the university to avoid paying faculty for doing 
nothing. (Indeed, given the potentially debilitating morale problem of the university, there 
is something to be said for paying the non-productive faculty well.) The first goal of the 
university is to enable deep specialization, and if there is one thing history tells us, it is 
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that deep specialization occurs when scholars are given a room of their own— 
unsupervised and unincentivized slack, for short.  
 
Last not least, ossification depends on the university’s relationship to the outside world. 
Departments and disciplines that are not linked to constituencies outside of the university 
can keep right on trucking in self-refential circles. They will move with the times if they 
are permeable to the outside world. In medicine, faculty who want to get National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) grants must select research topics and employ methods that find 
the approval of the NIH, and since the NIH is tied to Congress, and Congress is tied to the 
American people, new developments in the external society feed into the medical schools 
and influence medical research. Thus, we now examine whether doctors treat African 
American patients differently, and we now include women subjects in medical trials. In 
the short space of a decade, biology has completely resliced itself as a discipline in 
response to the external job and profit opportunities offered by biotechnology. The case of 
biology is instructive because it shows us how important it is not to go all the way: 
molecular biology has lost its slack because it has been taken over by the profit motive. 
Ideally, the university is partially permeable to the outside world, and it is best for it to 
have multiple cross-cutting connections and multiple contradictory external 
constituencies. 
 
Managing change in the university is not about putting centralized command-and-control 
systems in place or defining simplistic profit centres and performance standards or 
infusing the university with business values—this would be the death of the university. On 
the other hand, if the university is left in the hands of the faculty, it will surely turn into 
bone. Managing change is about designing decentralized structures that encourage 
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